Insider Trading & Executive Data
Start Free Trial
69 insider trades in the last year. Go beyond summary counts with transaction-level detail, compensation intelligence, and institutional ownership context.
Capri Holdings is a global luxury fashion group owning Versace, Jimmy Choo and Michael Kors, with FY2025 revenue of $4.44 billion and a product mix skewed toward accessories (49%), footwear (28%) and apparel (14%). Michael Kors is the largest contributor (~68% of sales), with Versace (~18%) and Jimmy Choo (~14%), and products are sold via ~1,158 company‑operated stores, wholesale, licensing and omni‑channel e‑commerce. Operations combine Italy‑based artisan production for Versace and Jimmy Choo with Asia‑sourced finished goods for Michael Kors, and the company is executing a multi‑year ERP and omni‑fulfillment rollout while managing inventory, tariffs and store rationalization. Recent performance has been weak (FY2025 revenue down 14.1%, large goodwill/brand impairments and a net loss), liquidity is adequate but leverage and covenant compliance are watched, and the company is navigating new U.S. tariffs and the announced Versace sale.
Given Capri’s luxury goods business and the FY2025 setback, executive pay is likely heavily weighted to a mix of base salary, annual cash incentives tied to near‑term sales, gross margin and operating metrics, and long‑term equity (RSUs/PSUs or options) tied to multi‑year financial performance and total shareholder return versus peers. Because brand value and stewardship are critical in luxury, long‑term awards and time‑based retention grants are common to align executives with multi‑year brand rebuilding and to discourage short‑term liquidation of creative investments; performance metrics will emphasize sell‑through, full‑price penetration, inventory turns, margin recovery and cost‑savings delivery (SG&A reduction, ERP execution). Recent impairments, the Versace divestiture and covenant considerations make discretionary bonuses and future incentive payouts sensitive to adjusted operating income, impairment testing outcomes and liquidity ranges, and change‑in‑control or termination provisions (post‑merger events) should be reviewed given recent M&A activity.
Insiders at Capri routinely hold significant equity via RSUs/PSUs and may face concentrated exposure due to Michael Kors’ revenue dominance; look for scheduled vesting and pre‑planned (10b5‑1) programs as the primary source of reported sales. Material non‑public developments that could drive or restrict trading include impairment testing results, quarterly sell‑through metrics, the Versace sale process, tariff announcements affecting sourcing costs, ERP go‑live disruptions and covenant red flags—any of which could prompt blackouts or accelerated insider activity when disclosed. Given recent net losses, reduced cash balances and elevated borrowings, insider sales for personal liquidity are plausible (and frequently observed in stressed retailers), while insider purchases would be a stronger bullish signal; all trades should be cross‑checked with Section 16 filings and 10b5‑1 plan disclosures because timing around earnings, store rationalizations and M&A is especially sensitive.