Insider Trading & Executive Data
Start Free Trial
0 insider trades in the last year. Go beyond summary counts with transaction-level detail, compensation intelligence, and institutional ownership context.
Fidus Investment Corporation (FDUS) is a publicly traded, externally managed business development company (BDC) that provides customized debt and selective equity financing to U.S. lower middle‑market companies (typical revenue $10M–$150M). Its portfolio is credit‑oriented (unitranche and first‑lien senior secured loans, plus selective second‑lien/subordinated and minority equity) with ~91 portfolio companies and roughly $1.1–1.15 billion fair value recent run‑rates and a weighted average yield on debt around 13%. FIC is externally managed by Fidus Investment Advisors (the company has no direct employees), uses two SBIC subsidiaries to access SBA‑guaranteed debentures for cheaper leverage, and operates under 1940 Act BDC, RIC and SBIC regulatory constraints. Performance and liquidity drivers are cyclical (credit cycles, interest rates, originations/repayments), and management highlights active portfolio recycling, ATM equity issuance and credit facility/SBIC access as key funding levers.
The advisor is paid via a two‑part fee (1.75% base management fee on assets plus incentive fees: a quarterly income‑related fee subject to a 2.0% quarterly hurdle/catch‑up and a 20% capital‑gains fee), so advisor revenue — and by extension executive pay at the advisor — is strongly tied to asset size, net investment income and realized/unrealized capital gains. Because officers are employees of the advisor rather than direct FIC employees, company filings will highlight advisor fee arrangements more than granular officer payouts; compensation incentives therefore favor growth in fee‑bearing assets, higher pre‑incentive income and successful exits. Fair‑value judgments, realized gains volatility and RIC distribution rules materially affect incentive fee realization and bonus timing, which can create incentives for portfolio recycling, timing of exits, and management of PIK/PIK‑type income. Regulatory requirements (BDC asset coverage, RIC distribution/excise tax rules, SBIC regulations) can also shape bonus structure and discretionary payouts to ensure compliance with distribution and leverage constraints.
Insider trading patterns at FIC are likely influenced by dividend announcements, ATM equity activity, leverage decisions (SBA debenture draws, revolver use) and quarter‑end NAV/valuation disclosures, since those items materially affect share value and management fees. Insiders and advisor employees have advance visibility into illiquid portfolio valuations and non‑accrual status, so standard blackout windows around financial reporting, large portfolio exits/repayments or material fair‑value adjustments are particularly important to observe. Because the advisor’s fees scale with assets and income, insider transactions (sales, option exercises or pre‑scheduled 10b5‑1 plans) can sometimes signal management’s assessment of near‑term capital needs or views on NAV sustainability; clustered sales after strong fee‑generating quarters or ahead of dilution‑enabling ATM issuance merit extra scrutiny. Finally, keep regulatory constraints in mind (1940 Act, SBIC rules and RIC distribution obligations) as they can both restrict timing of trades and create predictable liquidity events that drive insider activity.